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“We Thinking” and its Consequences
By Robert Akerlof∗
Traditionally, economists have modeled
agents as individualistic, uninfluenced by
their social context, and motivated only by
personal gain. However, increasingly, they
have been drawing on concepts from outside
economics – such as “norms,” “esteem,”
and “identity” – to model agents’ social na-
tures.
A key reason for studying such social mo-
tivation is to shed light on the conditions
that facilitate – or deter – collective ac-
tion. It has been widely observed, for in-
stance, that groups are more able to en-
gage in collective action when they have a
common, group identity (see Polletta and
Jasper (2001) for a discussion). This pa-
per will give one explanation for such a
link. The paper will develop a new con-
cept, “we thinking”; and it will also provide
a deeper understanding of the concepts of
norms, identity, and esteem.
I. “We thinking”
One way to solve collective action prob-
lems is by punishing noncooperation. Pun-
ishments serve to align individuals’ incen-
tives with those of the group. Economists
have focused almost exclusively on solu-
tions to collective action problems of this
form.
I would define true collective action dif-
ferently, however. When agents are truly
engaged in collective action, they are not
acting individualistically, but instead are
motivated to pursue group ends.
I define “we thinking” as a mode of think-
ing in which an individual takes a group’s
goals as his own. Normally, agents are as-
sumed to be individualistic; but a number
of scholars have posited that agents can be
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induced to think in “we” – rather than in
“I” – terms. According to Searle (1990), for
instance: “Collective intentional behavior is
a primitive phenomenon which cannot be
analyzed as just the summation of individ-
ual intentional behavior.” But so far, mod-
els in which cooperation reflects true col-
lective action have gained at most a small
toehold in economic analysis (see Gold and
Sugden (2007)).
There are countless real-world examples
of situations in which individuals appar-
ently act selflessly: in the best interest of
their families, firms, teams, political par-
ties, and countries. Social psychologists
speak of “task cohesion,” which refers to
agents’ ability to share a commitment to
group goals. Military psychologists and
sociologists have emphasized that soldiers
who risk their lives typically are motivated
by what is best for the group (see, for ex-
ample, Shils and Janowitz (1948)).
It is clear that we-thinking can facilitate
collective action, but what leads members
of a group to think in we-terms rather than
in I-terms? Various scholars (see, for in-
stance, Tyler (1999)) have suggested that
when there is a sense of group pride, agents
are more likely to think in we-terms.
The explanation we shall offer here is
that, when an agent thinks in we-terms,
he is concerned with the esteem accorded
the group rather than the esteem accorded
himself as an individual. Therefore, the
utility associated with we-thinking depends
upon how the group is esteemed. Agents
may not always have the freedom to choose
whether to think in we-terms; most likely,
we-thinking is cued rather than a choice.
Nonetheless, if we-thinking is pleasurable,
agents will seek out – rather than avoid –
cues that induce we-thinking.
To summarize the argument so far, I have
argued that group pride facilitates collec-
tive action because, when the group is a
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source of pride for agents, they are more
inclined to think in “we” terms.
Our objective, however, is to link identity
to collective action. In this regard, this pa-
per will further argue that group identity
facilitates collective action because a com-
mon, group identity makes it possible for
agents to take pride in the group. For in-
stance, national pride seems to be based on
a conception of a national identity. When
a sports team wins a game, it is a source
of pride to both team members and fans. I
would argue that a sense of common iden-
tity underlies this ability to take pride in
the team’s accomplishments.
While we have sketched an argument as
to why identity matters for collective ac-
tion, a number of questions remain. What,
precisely is identity? What makes it possi-
ble for a fan of a sports team to take pride
in the team’s accomplishments when he has
no hand in bringing those accomplishments
about? The remainder of this article will be
concerned with: (1) defining identity and
group pride/esteem more precisely, and (2)
fleshing out why common, group identity is
necessary for there to be group pride.
II. Norms
To understand identity, group pride, and
the relationship between the two, we must
first take a step back and discuss norms.
How norms connect to pride and identity
will become clear presently.
Norms are defined differently by differ-
ent authors. A standard definition is that
norms are judgments of what is better and
worse behavior. But, one can also define
norms more broadly as judgments of any
type: judgments of actions, judgments of
people, judgments of outcomes.
The types of norms that will be of interest
to us are judgments of people and groups.
The judgment of a group G can be repre-
sented by a real-valued function Ni(s,G).
This function answers the question: in the
view of agent i, how good has group G been
in state s?1 In the event that a group G
consists of a single individual (G = {j}),
1The state s should be thought of as inclusive of any
variables that might be relevant for forming judgments.
Ni(s,G) is, in fact, a judgment of an indi-
vidual. I will use the notation Ni(s, j) in
place of Ni(s, {j}) to denote judgments of
individuals.
The connection to esteem is relatively
straightforward. Ni(s,G) is an absolute
judgment of how good an agent/group is.
Esteem is a judgment of how good an
agent/group is relative to a comparison pop-
ulation (P ). The following is a mathemat-
ical representation of agent i’s esteem for
group G in state s (Ei(s,G)):
Ei(s,G) = Ni(s,G)− 1|P |
∑
G′∈P
Ni(s,G
′).
This way of thinking about esteem is stan-
dard in social psychology (see R. Akerlof
(2015) for a discussion). I would note that
how the comparison group, P , is deter-
mined is an interesting question but it will
not be a focus of this article.2
We argued in the previous section that,
when an agent thinks in I-terms, he cares
about how he is esteemed as an individual:
that is, he cares about Ei(s, i) (self-esteem)
and perhaps Ej(s, i) (the esteem he is ac-
corded by other agents). When an agent
thinks in we-terms – or, to be more precise,
G-terms – he cares about how the group is
esteemed: that is, he cares about Ei(s,G)
(the esteem he accords the group) and per-
haps Ej(s,G) (the esteem others accord the
group). Agents will be inclined to think
in we-terms when Ei(s,G) and Ej(s,G) are
high (that is, when the group is a source of
pride). Agents will also be inclined to think
in we-terms when Ei(s, i) and Ej(s, i) are
low (that is, when agents are accorded low
individual esteem).
III. Identity
We have now linked norms to esteem. We
still need to link norms to identity. Before
we can do so, however, we must first define
2In Frank (1985)’s Choosing the Right Pond, agents
compare themselves to those in their own pond. The
pond is a choice in his model. In this sense, Frank (1985)
is exploring aspects of how the comparison population
P is determined.
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identity.
I propose to define personal identity as
“one’s belief about one’s type.” Or, put
another way, personal identity is who one
thinks one is. Note that I use the term
“type” to broadly refer to who a person is:
it includes such features of a person as their
character, ability, race, and gender.
I will denote an agent’s type by θi. An
agent’s type is composed of traits (T ): θi =
{θti}t∈T . Just as an individual has a type,
we can think of a group G as having a type,
consisting of those traits shared by group
members: θG = {θti}t∈TG , where TG denotes
the shared traits of group members and i ∈
G.
We can define “group identity” in an
analogous way to personal identity: as
the belief of group members regarding the
group’s type. The term “identification” is
also frequently used in the identity litera-
ture. We can define “identification” as a be-
lief that one shares traits with other agents.
I would note that, in G. Akerlof and
Kranton (2000)’s model of identity, one’s
identity may be a choice. Their way of
thinking about identity is not wholly incon-
sistent since it may be possible to choose
what one believes about one’s type.3
In the next section of the paper,
I will argue that how agents are
judged/esteemed will depend upon their
types. Consequently, a link exists between
norms/esteem, on the one hand, and
identity on the other hand.
3G. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest that tied
to identities are “prescriptions” regarding appropriate
behavior. For example, many people view it as appro-
priate for girls to play with dolls but inappropriate for
boys to do so. The framework proposed here can also
capture the idea of prescriptions. I would suggest that
agents hold beliefs regarding what constitutes “natural
behavior” for a person of a given type. It is a norm that
agents should behave naturally (i.e., agents are judged
to be worse, all else equal, when their behavior is less
natural). Returning to the doll example, the idea is that
it would be viewed as appropriate for girls to play with
dolls because it is natural for them to do so; it would
be viewed as inappropriate for boys to play with dolls
because it is unnatural for them to do so.
IV. Judgments and Type
I would now like to examine more care-
fully how agents form judgments of peo-
ple/groups. It is useful to think of agents
as applying a set of principles in form-
ing judgments: Ni(s,G) =
∑
D∈DGi D(s,G).
D ∈ DGi denotes a principle agent i uses in
judging group G; DGi ⊆ Di denotes the set
of principles, among all those used by agent
i (Di), that apply to group G.
It is clear that agents do not use identi-
cal principles in forming judgments. For
instance, one agent might particularly
weight athletic achievement while another
agent might particularly weight academic
achievement. Despite this lack of unifor-
mity, I claim that agents apply principles
that they believe have a certain property
(Property P).
DEFINITION 1: A principle has Property
P if it always judges an agent/group of a
given type the same way.4,5
To build some intuition, consider an ex-
ample. Suppose the performance of athletes
(pi) is given by: pi = ai · θi ·wi, where ai is
an athlete’s action choice, θi is an athlete’s
type, and wi is the weather. Consider the
principle D(s, j) = wj which judges ath-
letes solely on the weather. If this principle
were applied, an athlete of a given type (θj)
would be judged differently depending upon
whether it happens to be rainy or sunny.
Therefore, Property P is violated.
A principle that clearly possesses Prop-
erty P is one that judges athletes based
4In ethics, there is a related literature on “moral
luck.” Suppose, for instance, drunk driver A is lucky
and does not have an accident while drunk driver B is
unlucky and does. Ethicists have observed that A and B
might be judged differently even if they are of the same
type (θA = θB). They have raised the issue of moral
luck precisely because they see it as an exception to the
general rule that agents of a given type are judged the
same. Note that I am claiming that agents believe their
principles have Property P – not that they always do.
This allows for some violations as described by ethicists.
5There are a number of stories – to give one example,
The Prince and the Pauper – in which characters trade
places or are switched at birth. These stories criticize
an existing social order by demonstrating violations of
Property P (i.e., the prince and pauper are of similar
type but are judged differently).
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upon type alone: D(s, j) = θj. However,
this is not necessarily the only such prin-
ciple. Suppose, for instance, all athletes
choose aj = 1. Then,
pj
wj
= θj. Therefore,
D(s, j) = pj
wj
also has Property P.
An interesting feature of this principle is
that, ex post, an athlete is judged on his
type, but he is not judged on his type ex
ante. Ex ante, the athlete is judged on
his performance (discounting the effect of
weather); moreover, the athlete’s choice of
action affects how he is judged.
In the existing economics literature, I
would note that a number of papers have
assumed agents are judged based upon type
alone: for instance, Be´nabou and Tirole
(2002). However, other papers – for in-
stance, Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) – as-
sume that there are better and worse ac-
tions and that agents are judged to be bet-
ter (worse) when the actions they take are
better (worse). Property P says that both
types of judgment are admissible; however,
when people are judged ex ante on their ac-
tions, they must still be judged ex post on
type.
Property P requires that a principle must
judge two agents/groups, G and G′, the
same if they are of the same type. However,
it does not follow from Property P that
the overall judgments of two agents/groups
(Ni(s,G) and Ni(s,G
′)) must be the same
since different principles might be applied
to G and G′. Property Q, defined below, is
an elaboration of Property P that ensures
overall judgments of people/groups of the
same type will be the same. I claim that
agents, in fact, apply principles that they
believe meet Property Q.
DEFINITION 2: A principle D has Prop-
erty Q if there exist traits, TD, such that:
(1) D applies to group G if and only if
its members share traits TD; and (2) Two
groups, G and G′, that share traits TD are
always judged the same.
Property Q explains our basic puzzle of
why common, group identity is necessary
for there to be group pride. An example
will help to illustrate. When the Yankees
win the World Series (as they often do), it
is a source of pride to many New Yorkers.
What underlies such pride-taking? It seems
clear that New Yorkers are applying a prin-
ciple, Dbaseball, that judges cities on the per-
formance of their sports teams. New York-
ers take pride in their city because Dbaseball
judges their city well relative to other cities.
Property Q says that, in order to apply
the principle Dbaseball to cities, New Yorkers
must believe that: (1) people within cities
share certain traits (Tbaseball), and (2) how
a city’s baseball team performs is a function
of these shared traits. (1) is the key point to
be emphasized. Framed differently, (1) says
that, to take pride in New York, New York-
ers must believe their city and comparison
cities have distinct, group identities.
Property Q has another implication of in-
terest. It says that a principle D that ap-
plies to a group G has the property that
D(s,G) = D(s, i) for all i ∈ G. In other
words, principles that judge groups also
judge group members. Applied to our ex-
ample, this means that if New York (as a
whole) is judged/esteemed on how the Yan-
kees perform, so too are New Yorkers indi-
vidually. Because of Property Q, we can
think of an individual’s esteem as deriving
from various components of his identity. A
particular New Yorker will derive some es-
teem from his identity as a New Yorker (i.e.,
from principles that apply to the group of
New Yorkers, to which he belongs); he will
also, most likely, derive esteem from other
aspects of his identity (his family, his work-
place, and also aspects of his identity that
are idiosyncratic to himself). Returning to
our discussion of we-thinking, the implica-
tion is that the willingness to engage in G-
thinking will depend upon how much es-
teem an agent derives from his identity as
part of group G relative to other parts of
his identity.
V. Implications for Identity Formation
We have accomplished the main aim of
this article: namely, to show why groups
with a sense of common identity find it eas-
ier to engage in collective action. It is worth
noting, though, that the framework may be
useful for understanding how agents’ prin-
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ciples and identities form. To the extent
that identities and principles (Di) are cho-
sen, the framework suggests that esteem
considerations – the desire for self-esteem
and peer esteem – may play an important
role in shaping them.
R. Akerlof (2015) presents a model in
which agents choose their principles. A ten-
sion exists in the model between agents’ de-
sire, on the one hand, to adopt the same
principles as peers (i.e., conform) for the
sake of peer esteem and a desire to adopt
different principles (i.e., differentiate) for
the sake of self-esteem.
I would suggest that a similar tension ex-
ists in the choice of identities. There is a
desire, on the one hand, to differentiate in
one’s choice of identity. If one believes one-
self to be of exactly the same type as ev-
eryone else, Property Q requires that one
judge oneself the same. In order to have
positive self-esteem (Ei(s, i) > 0), it is nec-
essary to believe that people are, at least
in some ways, different. New Yorkers must
view themselves as different from Bosto-
nians, for example, in order to think of
themselves as superior. On the other hand,
there are incentives for agents to form iden-
tity groups. Agents are normally inclined
to disesteem one another since only by es-
teeming others less can one raise one’s self-
esteem; but, when agents identify with one
another, it creates incentives to positively
esteem one another: there is a mutual de-
sire to judge the shared type well. New
Yorkers enjoy, for example, being able to
engage in mutual pride-taking over a win by
the Yankees. Therefore, just as agents’ de-
sire for self-esteem motivates disidentifica-
tion with Boston, the desire for peer esteem
motivates New Yorkers to forge a common,
group identity.6
Agents’ tendency to sort into what psy-
6In a series of influential experiments, Henri Tajfel
and coauthors have found that even randomly assign-
ing subjects to groups leads subjects to identify with
those in their own group and view those in their own
group as superior (i.e., worthy of greater esteem). This
finding aligns with the perspective I have just given in
which identities are motivated by esteem considerations.
I would suggest that the experimental assignment has an
effect because it coordinates agents to engage in mutual
pride-taking along certain lines.
chologists call “ingroups” and “outgroups”
has important implications for collective ac-
tion. It means that, almost inevitably, some
groups will find it easy to engage in collec-
tive action while others will find it difficult.
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